Abstract
Bryan, Karlan, and Nelson map commitment devices: contracts, stakes, and deadlines that make a later change of mind more expensive than keeping the choice you already made.
Bryan, G., Karlan, D., & Nelson, S. (2010). Annual Review of Economics, 2(1), 671–698. DOI
Key findings
- Cost of defection — The device works by raising the price of not doing the thing, not by adding a new reason.
- Fence, not trait — Stakes, deadlines with another party, and restricted choice are arrangements. They are not a score of character.
Limits
Cite-anchor shelf — review article, not a new experiment. Crossref confirms the 2010 Annual Review of Economics record (2(1), 671–698). The review covers economic commitment devices. It does not rank which hardness of fence fits a given morning.
Application
When you ignore a reminder, raise one fence — a stake, a person, or a deadline you cannot talk past — before you add another motive (Degree of constraint).